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I.

INTRODUCTION

On June 23, 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
decided what is now the seminal case of Goldstein v. SEC.1 In Goldstein, Philip
Goldstein, a prominent hedge fund manager, challenged the validity of the “Hedge
Fund Rule,” promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or
the “Commission”).2 The basic premise of the rule was that although many hedge
funds were exempt from registration with the SEC under certain provisions in the
federal securities laws, 3 the rule redefined “client” under the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 4 (“Advisers Act”) to include individual shareholders, partners, or
beneficial owners.5 Prior to the Hedge Fund Rule, hedge funds were able to
circumvent registration under the Advisers Act because the hedge fund manager
could count the fund itself as a client, rather than the individual investors of the
fund, and therefore, meet the exemption requirement of having fewer than fifteen
clients.6 Under the Hedge Fund Rule’s redefinition of client, however, many hedge
funds that had been exempt would have had to register and comply with SEC
regulations by February 1, 2006.7
In Goldstein, the Court of Appeals struck down the Hedge Fund Rule as being
“completely arbitrary.”8 Even though the SEC announced shortly thereafter that it
would not seek an appeal,9 the SEC was not finished attempting to regulate hedge

1.

451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

2.

Id. at 874.

3.

For an overview of the registration exemptions available to hedge funds under the federal securities
laws, see Sargon Daniel, Note, Hedge Fund Registration: Yesterday’s Regulatory Schemes for Today’s
Investment Vehicles, 2007 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 247, 257–67.

4.

Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2006).

5.

Id. § 80b-3(b)(3); see also Sue Ann Mota, Hedge Funds: Their Advisers Do Not Have to Register with the
SEC, but More Information and Other Alternatives Are Recommended, 67 La. L. Rev. 55, 64 (2006).

6.

See Henry Ordower, Demystifying Hedge Funds: A Design Primer, 7 U.C. Davis Bus. L. J. 323, 326
(2007) (“The revised regulations [the Hedge Fund Rule] would have altered the manner in which an
investment advisor counts clients. Managers who previously did not have to register because they had
fewer than fifteen clients would have had to count each investor in a hedge fund—rather than only the
fund itself—as a client for purposes of the fewer than fifteen client rule.”).

7.

See Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 877.

8.

Id. at 883.

9.

Hedge Fund Manager May Challenge SEC, L.A. Times, Sept. 13, 2006, at C4.
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funds,10 and hedge fund managers, like Philip Goldstein, were certainly not done
attacking other SEC regulations that affect hedge funds.11
Despite the Court of Appeals’s rejection of the Hedge Fund Rule, hedge funds
that are not required to register with the SEC may still be subject to certain disclosure
requirements. One such disclosure requirement is section 13(f) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), which requires institutional investment
managers,12 whether registered with the SEC or not, who hold securities with a
10. See Keith W. Miller & Jean M. Vrola, The SEC Continues to Scrutinize Hedge Funds and File Enforcement

Actions, 236 N.Y. L.J. 9 (2006); Nicolas Morgan, Perrie M. Weiner & Edward Totino, SEC Rings in
2007 with Three-Pronged Assault on Hedge Funds and PIPEs, 12 No. 21 Andrews Sec. Litig. & Reg.
Rep. 2 (2007); Ordower, supra note 6, at 326–27; See also, e.g., How Rich Is Rich Enough to Invest in a
Hedge Fund?, The Kiplinger Letter, May 18, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 9473733 (“The SEC
will raise the bar this year, requiring that investors in the roughly 9000 lightly regulated investment
pools [i.e., hedge funds] worldwide have at least $2.5 million in investable assets before taking the
plunge. The amount must exclude equity in a home or business. The new threshold is quite a jump
from the current criteria: $1 million in net worth and $200,000 in annual income for individuals or
$300,000 for couples.”).
11.

In the fall of 2006, Phillip Goldstein announced that he would next attack the SEC regarding section
13(f)’s disclosure requirements. See Do Hedge Funds Hold ‘Trade Secrets’?, Bus. Wk. Online, Sept. 13,
2006, http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/sep2006/pi20060913_356291.htm; Riva
Froymovich, Hedge Fund Manager May Challenge SEC—Again, Investment News, Sept. 18, 2006, at
6; Lori Pizzani, Hedge Fund to Challenge SEC, Again: Denial of 13f Regulatory Exemption to Prompt New
Lawsuit, Money Mgmt. Executive, Sept. 18, 2006. According to Mr. Goldstein, his “investments
. . . are his intellectual property—trade secrets that the SEC shouldn’t force him to reveal any more than
it would ask Yum Brands to put the recipe for KFC chicken into its annual report.” Michael Maiello,
Hands Off My Stocks, Forbes, Dec. 11, 2006, at 58. By likening his investments to trade secrets, Mr.
Goldstein has claimed that mandatory disclosure of those investments to the SEC constitutes a
government taking of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id. To
view Mr. Goldstein’s application for exemption from Rule 13f-1, see Full Value Advisors, Application
for an Order Pursuant to § 13(f)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“The 1934 Act”) for
Exemption from Rule 13f-1 of the 1934 Act (Oct. 24, 2006), available at http://www.pomtalk.com/
pomtalk /f iles/request_for_exemption_from_rule_13f1.pdf [hereinafter Goldstein Exemption
Application]. For a detailed analysis of Mr. Goldstein’s application, see Edward Pekarek, Note, Hogging
the Hedge? “Bulldog’s” 13F Theory May Not Be So Lucky, 12 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 1079 (2007). In
Mr. Pekarek’s estimation
[t]he Goldstein Application is certainly a creative and colorful document filled with the
sort of irascible rhetoric that made Philip Goldstein a recognized market maverick in 2006.
However, when one delves deeper than what is in some instances little more than baseless
bluster, the Application falls short at a number of levels.
Id. at 1180.

12. For the purposes of section 13(f), an institutional investment manager “includes any person, other than

a natural person, investing in or buying and selling securities for its own account, and any person
exercising investment discretion with respect to the account of any other person.” 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)
(5)(A) (2006). According to the SEC’s website about Form 13F, an institutional investment manager
is:
(1) an entity that invests in, or buys and sells, securities for its own account; or (2) a person
or an entity that exercises investment discretion over the account of any other person or
entity. Institutional investment managers can include investment advisers, banks, insurance
companies, broker-dealers, pension funds, and corporations.
SEC, Form 13F—Reports Filed by Institutional Investment Managers, http://www.sec.gov/answers/
form13f.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
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combined value of at least $100 million to disclose their holdings on a quarterly
basis.13 That disclosure, known as a Form 13F report, is shortly thereafter made
public by the SEC. Many hedge funds’ securities holdings—specifically, the way in
which those holdings are allocated—represent a core part of their trading strategies
and arguably their trade secrets.14 In a difficult and volatile market, these trading
strategies take on even more importance.15
The SEC has the discretion to grant confidential treatment to an institutional
investment manager’s Form 13F report under the Freedom of Information Act
(“FOIA”).16 The available FOIA exemption for trade secrets, however, is narrowly
defined, and if the SEC refuses to grant confidential treatment to a Form 13F report,
the only recourse that a manager has is to bring a court action.17 In reviewing an
agency’s “reverse-FOIA”18 decision, courts apply an “arbitrary and capricious”
standard, which gives the court very little discretion to overturn an agency’s decision.19
Therefore, a hedge fund manager seeking confidential treatment of a Form 13F
report has a difficult burden to overcome.
Part II of this note explores the history and growth of hedge funds. Part III
examines the legislative history of section 13(f) of the Exchange Act, as well as the
disclosure requirements and exemptions. Part IV argues that the exemptions available
to institutional investment managers who wish to keep their Form 13F reports nonpublic are extremely narrow and that the standard of review for agency decisions
regarding confidential treatment of involuntary information is too strict. This note
concludes that the SEC should consider providing an automatic exemption to hedge
fund managers who wish to receive confidential treatment for their holdings.
II. THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS

A. What Is a Hedge Fund?
There is no statutory definition of hedge funds provided by the securities laws;20
however, a hedge fund is typically thought of as “any pooled investment vehicle that
13. See infra Part III.A and note 59.
14.

See infra Parts III.C, IV.

15.

See, e.g., Duff McDonald, The Running of the Hedgehogs, N.Y. Mag., Apr. 9, 2007, available at http://
nymag.com/news/features/2007/hedgefunds/30341/. According to McDonald, hedge funds remain
popular despite their “uneven performance of late” in part because of “how they performed five years
ago”: from 2000 to 2002, “when the market fell 40 percent following the dot-com collapse, the average
hedge fund didn’t lose money.” Id.

16. See infra Part III.C.
17.

See infra Part III.C.

18. See infra Part III.C.
19.

See infra Part III.C.

20. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 874–75; Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 Temp. L. Rev.

681, 683 (2000). History has it that
[t]he term “hedge fund” was coined in 1949 when it was used to describe a private
partnership managed by Alfred Winslow Jones. Fearing poor returns during market
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is privately organized, professionally administered, and not widely available to the
public.”21 Hedge funds “are different from other investment vehicles, such as mutual
funds or other types of asset managed funds, because they tend to employ leverage
more aggressively and they engage in highly active and short-term trading strategies.”22
Although hedge funds often engage in long-short strategies to achieve high returns, 23
there are many other strategies that may be employed.24 For example:
[H]edge funds don’t make returns just by taking short positions . . . against a
particular asset class. Instead, the hedges deploy a vast arsenal of approaches:
short positions, long positions (bets on a price increase of a particular asset),
long-short, neutral, directional, event-driven, multistrategy, equity, bond,
global macro, commodity and others. 25

Moreover, although hedge funds are typically considered “private,” Fortress
Investment Group LLC, an alternative asset manager that includes a hedge fund,
went public in February 2007, thus further complicating the common notion of a
hedge fund.26
While it is true that there have been significant hedge fund collapses, which
have harmed the investors of those funds, 27 hedge funds also provide the financial
markets with important benefits. For example, “[h]edge funds invest in new and
often undercapitalized markets. This enhances liquidity in less traditional markets.
Hedge funds also often purchase derivatives and take short positions, which increases
slumps, Jones created a “hedging” strategy that would neutralize the effect of market
factors on his portfolio’s performance. He invested in both long and short positions in
common stocks, while using a modest amount of leverage to hedge his bets, so that changes
in equity markets would affect only half of his investment portfolio.
Melissa Antoszewski, Las Vegas Style Investing: In the Absence of Regulation, Risky Hedge Fund Bets Can
Win Big and Lose Even More, 8 Transactions: Tenn. J. Bus. L. 381, 382 (2007).
21.

Mota, supra note 5, at 55.

22.

Gibson, supra note 20, at 683.

23.

See Alan J. Berkley & Michael J. Savitz, Recent SEC Proposal on Short Position Disclosure, in Advanced
Securities Law Workshop 1991, at 137, 146–47 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice Handbook Series No.
B4-6975, 1991), WL 748 PLI/Corp 137. According to the authors:
A short sale is the sale of a security that the seller does not own or that he owns but does
not deliver. In order to deliver the security to the purchaser, the short seller will borrow
the security, typically from a broker-dealer or an institutional investor. The short seller
later closes out the position by returning the security to the lender, typically by purchasing
equivalent securities on the open market. In general, short selling is utilized to profit from
an expected downward price movement, or to hedge the risk of a long position in the same
security or in a related security.
Id. Essentially, taking a long position is betting that its value will increase, while taking a short position
is betting that its value will decrease.

24.

See Gibson, supra note 20, at 685–86 (discussing various hedge fund trading strategies).

25.

Michael Wallace, Will Hedge Funds Get Squeezed?, Bus Wk Online, Apr. 4, 2005, http://www.
businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/apr2005/nf2005044_1038_db016.htm.

26. Fortress Inv. Group LLC, Prospectus (Form 424B4) (Feb. 8, 2007).
27.

See infra Part II.C.
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reliability to market prices and may limit irrational security appreciation.” 28
Furthermore, shortly after the decision in Goldstein, members of the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs “uniformly acknowledged the
significant and beneficial role that hedge funds play in today’s market by contributing
to market diversification, efficiency, and liquidity . . . .”29
B. The Proliferation of Hedge Funds
In 2003, the SEC published a staff report that examined the effects and
implications of hedge fund growth. The report noted that, despite a lack of
information about hedge funds, the SEC refocused its attention on hedge funds and
their potential regulation because of the “recent growth of the industry and the
increase of investments in hedge funds by institutions.”30 The staff report further
noted that:
The Commission’s inability to examine hedge fund advisers has the direct
effect of putting the Commission in a “wait and see” posture vis-à-vis fraud
and other misconduct. . . . We also are concerned that some hedge fund
investors may not always receive useful information about the investment
adviser and its management of the fund. . . . One of our key concerns relates
to the manner by which hedge fund advisers value hedge fund assets . . . . Our
concern not only reflects our recognition of the incentives that may cause an
adviser to inaccurately value hedge fund assets, but it also reflects our concern
that registered funds that invest their assets in hedge funds may lack access to
information that enables them to “fair value” their interests in hedge funds
and therefore accurately calculate their net asset value.31

Although regulators are often focused on the proliferation of hedge funds, the
interest in these funds is also based on the fact that hedge fund managers are some of
the richest people32 in America.33 One journalist, who examined the extreme wealth
28. Carl J. Nelson, Note, Hedge Fund Regulation: A Proposal to Maintain Hedge Funds’ Effectiveness Without

SEC Regulation, 2 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 221, 234–35 (2007); see also Berkeley & Savitz,
supra note 23, at 147 (“Short selling provides the market with two important benefits: market liquidity
and pricing efficiency.”).
29. Barry P. Barbash, Recent Regulatory Developments Affecting Private Funds, 2006 A.L.I.-A.B.A 119, 124

(2006).
30. SEC, Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds x (2003) [hereinafter SEC Staff Report],

available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf.
31.

Id. at x–xi.

32.

See David Leonhardt, Worth a Lot, but Are Hedge Funds Worth It?, N.Y. Times, May 23, 2007, at C1.

33.

See, e.g., Jenny Anderson & Julie Creswell, Make Less Than $240 Million? You’re off Top Hedge Fund List,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 2007, at A1 (noting that the earnings of the leading hedge fund managers “dwarf[]
that of the top chiefs on Wall Street”); Jenny Anderson, Managers Use Hedge Funds As Big I.R.A.’s, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 17, 2007, at A1 (attributing this “new class of financial giants,” in part, to hedge fund
managers’ “ability to earn the bulk of their compensation offshore and invest it in their funds, where it
grows tax-free”); The Rankings: The Hedge-Fund Elite, N.Y. Mag., April 16, 2007, at 46 (“Steven Cohen
($2.5 billion), and Paul Tudor Jones II ($2 billion)”); Thierry Olivier Desmet, Understanding Hedge Fund
Adviser Regulation, 4 Hastings Bus. L. J. 1, 1 (2008) (“[H]edge funds have reached a near-mythical
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of hedge fund managers located in Greenwich, Connecticut, based her definition of
hedge funds on their respective fee structures:
The typical hedge fund charges its investors an annual management fee of 2
percent of assets under management—plus a performance fee equal to 20
percent of that year’s return. In other words, just for showing up at work, the
manager of a midsize hedge fund with $2 billion in assets is guaranteed to
earn $40 million a year in fees alone. That’s before his cut of any returns.34

Considering that as of early 2008 hedge funds managed approximately $2 trillion,35
there is certainly a great amount of money to be made by hedge fund managers.
This estimate nearly doubles a mid-2006 figure reporting that hedge funds managed
roughly $1 trillion.36 Furthermore, comparing these figures to a 1998 statistic, which
reported that hedge funds had approximately $200 to $300 billion in capital, 37 it
becomes clearer that there has been an influx of capital into hedge funds, and that is
certainly one reason why hedge funds receive such attention.38

status in the securities industry, inspiring feelings of admiration and fascination, but also envy and fear
in many people.”); Leonhardt, supra note 32 (attributing hedge funds’ success to their fee structure and
that they take a large cut of profits above a predetermined benchmark); Nina Munk, Greenwich’s
Outrageous Fortune, Vanity Fair, July 2006, at 124, 129 (“On the latest Forbes Four Hundred list of
the richest Americans you’ll find four people who live in Greenwich; three of them manage hedge
funds: Edward Lampert (estimated net worth: $3.5 billion).”); see also discussion infra Part II.C.
34. Munk, supra note 33, at 130; see also Desmet, supra note 33, at 6 (“Hedge fund managers charge hefty

fees well in excess of those usually associated with money management. Typically, these fees include a
management fee of 1 to 2% of an investor’s assets under management in addition to a bonus or incentive
fee of 15 to 20% of the fund’s profits. In a year with generally good performance from the market
averages, the managers of the largest hedge funds can earn several hundred million dollars by
substantially outperforming them.”). Furthermore, one of the reasons why many hedge funds do not
want to register with the SEC is because of the effect such registration would have on their fees. See
Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 877 n.3 (“[R]egistered advisers must open their records to the Commission upon
request and cannot charge their clients a performance fee unless such clients have a net worth of at least
$1.5 million or at least $750,000 under management with the adviser.” (internal citation omitted)).
35.

See, e.g., Jenny Anderson, Wall Street Winners Hit a New Jackpot: Billion-Dollar Paydays, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 16, 2008, at A1 (reporting that there are an estimated 10,000 hedge funds in existence, with
approximately $2 trillion of assets).

36. Regulating Hedge Funds: The Wilder Side of Finance, Economist, July 1–7, 2006, at 11.
37.

Gibson, supra note 20, at 685.

38. According to an article in New York Magazine, “there are more than 9,000 hedge funds, 351 of which

manage $1 billion or more.” McDonald, supra note 15; see also Stephen Fraidin & Daniel S. Hoverman,
Hedge Fund Activism, in 38th Annual Institute on Securities Regulation 401, 405 (PLI/Corp.
Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 9151, 2006), available at WL 1571 PLI/Corp 401
(“SEC Chairman Christopher Cox testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs on July 25, 2006, that ‘the SEC’s best estimate is that there are now approximately
8,800 hedge funds, with approximately $1.2 trillion of assets. If this estimate is accurate, it implies a
remarkable growth in hedge fund assets of almost 3,000% in the last 16 years.’”).
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C. Significant Hedge Fund Collapses
Investors, regulators, and lay people became especially cognizant of hedge funds
when Long-Term Capital Management (“LTCM”) collapsed in 1998, resulting in a
“bailout of over $3.5 billion, . . . the largest-ever bailout of a hedge fund by private
financial institutions.”39 Due to the large amount of leverage that was provided to
LTCM, the fund’s creditors would have lost an enormous amount of capital if the
bailout did not occur, potentially crippling the financial markets in the process.40
Founded in 1993 and located in Greenwich, Connecticut,41 LTCM was the
brainchild of John W. Meriwether, a successful bond arbitrageur.42 Meriwether was
a strong believer in the unfailing accuracy of models to predict dips in the market,
which he could exploit to his advantage. He recruited likeminded individuals,
particularly academics, to work for LTCM, including two Nobel Prize winners.43
As is often seen in hedge funds’ strategies, Meriwether chose to leverage the fund to
increase returns, resulting in “more than $1 trillion worth of exposure” for the large
Wall Street banks that provided the fund with leverage.44 Although LTCM was
originally touted as the golden child of hedge funds because of its annual returns,
which often exceeded forty percent,45 its swift and frightening collapse has made it
synonymous with the dangers of hedge funds.46 Partially as a result of LTCM’s
collapse, the SEC promulgated the now defunct Hedge Fund Rule.47

39.

Mota, supra note 5, at 62–63. Apparently, the collapse occurred because LTCM “used $30 of leverage
for every $1 in capital.” Munk, supra note 33, at 130.

40. See Gibson, supra note 20, at 681–82.
41.

According to one commentator, “the highest concentration of hedge fund advisers appears to be in
Connecticut, where at least 512 hedge funds, managing around $111 billion, existed as of late September
2005.” Desmet, supra note 33, at 5.

42.

See generally Roger Lowenstein, When Genius Failed: The Rise and Fall of Long-Term
Capital Management (2000) (chronicling the formation and collapse of LTCM).

43.

Id. at 116.

44. Id. at xix.
45.

Id.

46. See, e.g., Tobias Adrian, Measuring Risk in the Hedge Fund Sector, 13 Current Issues in Econ. & Fin.

¶ 2 (2007) (“[T]he collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998
seemed to confirm fears that heavy losses by hedge funds have the potential to drain significant liquidity
from key financial markets.”). LTCM’s demise was predicated on a number of factors, “[t]he perfect
storm of [:] (i) high leverage, (ii) adverse and unanticipated market events, (iii) poor risk management,
and (iv) shrinking liquidity in the financial markets.” Rhett G. Campbell, Financial Markets Contracts
and BAPCPA, 79 Am. Bankr. L.J. 697, 699 (2005). For a more detailed analysis of LTCM’s collapse,
see Lowenstein, supra note 42, at 123–85.
47.

Recent Cases, District of Columbia Circuit Vacates Securities and Exchange Commission’s “Hedge Fund Rule,”
120 Harv. L. Rev. 1394, 1394 (2007) [hereinafter Recent Cases]; see also Daniel P. Collins, Manipulating
a Hedge Fund Blow-Up, Futures Mag. Group, Sept. 1, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 17122369
(indicating that the implosion of LTCM created calls for regulatory action).
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LTCM is not the only hedge fund to collapse or the last to garner the attention
of regulators.48 Although it apparently began as a legitimate hedge fund in the 1990s,
Bayou Funds, a Connecticut-based hedge fund, suffered losses, which it concealed
from its investors through an elaborate accounting scheme and by proclaiming
inaccurate returns.49 According to an SEC press release, “from 1996 through 2005,
investors deposited over $450 million into the Bayou Funds,” and the fund’s managers
“grossly exaggerat[ed] the Funds’ performance to make it appear that the Funds were
profitable and attractive investments, when in fact, the Funds had never posted a
year-end profit.”50
The more recent collapse of another Greenwich-based hedge fund, Amaranth
Advisers (“Amaranth”), has also drawn the attention of regulators and investors.51 In
September 2006, Amaranth, which employed a multi-strategy trading tactic,52 lost
approximately $6 billion.53 The immense loss was essentially based on a single
trading strategy: a bet that the future prices of natural gas would rise in certain
months in a two-year period.54 That a hedge fund could collapse because of a single
strategy, or even a single trade, is not extraordinary.55 However, Amaranth’s collapse
48. See, e.g., James Mackintosh, Resurrection of a Hedge Fund, Fin. Times, Aug. 23, 2007, available at http://

search.ft.com/ftArticle?queryText=Resurrection+of+a+Hedge+Fund&y=0&aje=true&x=0&id=070823
000626&ct=0 (discussing the investigation of the collapse of Amaranth Advisors). The call for
regulation of hedge funds is not strictly limited to the United States. Germany’s finance minister, Peer
Steinbruck, also “has been calling for increased scrutiny of hedge funds.” German Sees Sentiment for
Hedge Fund Rules, Int’l Herald Trib., Sept. 5, 2007, at 9, available at 2007 WLNR 17307698; see also
Alistair MacDonald & Deborah Solomon, Hedge Funds from Europe Take a Crack at Self-Policing, Wall
St. J., Oct. 11, 2007, at C1 (discussing regulation of hedge funds as a political issue in Europe).
49. See Roddy Boyd, Burning Hedges—One Time Whiz Kid Knew How to Cover Tracks, N.Y. Post, Dec. 17,

2006, at 31; Roddy Boyd, Mets Owner Sued in Bayou Collapse, N.Y. Post, Sept. 13, 2006, at 42; Greg
Farrell, Empty Promises in Hedge Fund Fraud, USA Today, Sept. 30, 2005, at 3B.
50. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Samuel Israel III, Daniel E. Marino, Bayou Mgmt, and Bayou

Funds for Defrauding Hedge Fund Investors and Misappropriating Investor Assets (Sept. 25, 2005)
(emphasis added), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-139.htm. Both Marino and Israel
were sentenced to twenty years in prison and required to make millions of dollars in restitution. Leslie
Gervirtz & Martha Graybow, Bayou Co-Founder Sentenced to 20 Years in Prison, Reuters, Apr. 14,
2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSN1436726120080415.
51.

See Mackintosh, supra note 48.

52.

See Gretchen Morgenson & Jenny Anderson, A Hedge Fund’s Loss Rattles Nerves, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19,
2006, at C1 (adding that, in light of Amaranth’s “huge losses in a single sector,” the term “multistrategy
seems to have been a misnomer”).

53.

See Recent Cases, supra note 47, at 1394.

54. See, e.g., Morgenson & Anderson, supra note 52 (“Amaranth’s biggest stake was a combination bet on

the spread between natural gas futures prices for March 2007 and those for April 2007. Amaranth had
often bet that the spread on that so-called shoulder month—when natural gas inventories stop being
drawn down and begin to rise—would increase.”).
55.

See, e.g., A.V. Rajwade, The Head and Tail of Hedge Funds, Bus. Standard, Oct. 9, 2006, at 8, available
at http://www.business-standard.com/india/storypage.php?autono=261024 (noting that “the mortality
rate in hedge funds is around 7 to 10 per cent per annum of the population with a much higher percentage
in the first year”); Gregory Zuckerman, Veteran Trader Loses Investor, Closes a Fund, Wall St. J., Oct.
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resulted in an action brought against the fund and its lead trader, Brian Hunter, by
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission for price manipulation, as well as a
congressional study by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
(“PSI”), which found widespread effects, such as increased prices and volatility in the
market, due to Amaranth’s trades in natural gas.56 Again, as with LTCM and Bayou
Funds, the collapse of Amaranth drew the attention of both investors and regulators
to the question of hedge fund regulation.57
III. SECTION 13(F) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

A. What Must Non-Regulated Hedge Funds Disclose?
An investment company, fund, or firm that is not registered with the SEC and
therefore not generally subject to the various federal securities regulations does not
have to disclose much information to the SEC.58 The accompanying rule for section
13(f)59 of the Exchange Act, Rule 13f-1,60 requires, however, that “[e]very institutional
investment manager which exercises investment discretion with respect to accounts
holding section 13(f) securities . . . having an aggregate fair market value on the last
trading day of any month of any calendar year of at least $100,000,000 shall file a
report on Form 13F . . . .”61 Rule 13f-1 further describes an institutional investment
manager as someone “deemed to exercise ‘investment discretion’ with respect to all
accounts over which any person under its control exercises investment discretion.”62
10, 2007, at C2 (explaining that a hedge fund manager closed one of his funds after a large investor
redeemed its capital).
56. Collins, supra note 47 (“It’s one thing when speculators gamble with their own money; it’s another when

they turn U.S. energy markets into a lottery where everybody is forced to gamble with them.” (quoting
Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.), chairman of the PSI) (internal quotations omitted)).
57.

See, e.g., U.S. SEC Steps Up Probe of Hedge Fund Trading, Hedge World Daily News, Sept. 27, 2007,
available at 2007 WLNR 18976792. Even the self-regulatory organizations (the “SROs”) have begun
targeting hedge funds. See, e.g., Otis Bilodeau, NASD Widens Inquiry into Hedge Fund Sales, Int’l
Herald Trib., Feb. 3, 2006, at 15. State regulators have also turned their attention to hedge funds,
particularly Connecticut, the home-base of three of the most notorious hedge fund collapses in recent
history. See, e.g., Michael Peltz, Not in My Backyard, Institutional Investor., Aug. 2006, at 20
(noting that Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal has been “pushing for broader and
tougher oversight of the industry—in particular, for greater disclosure and accountability”). However,
it has also been argued that these collapses, LTCM and Amaranth in particular, are not appropriate
reasons for the SEC to regulate hedge funds. Nelson, supra note 28, at 229 (“[N]either example
demonstrates the need for hedge fund regulation because neither potential threat came to fruition; both
cases [LTCM and Amaranth] were solved without any serious harm to the economy.”).

58. See generally SEC Staff Report, supra note 30.
59.

15 U.S.C. § 78m(f) (2006).

60. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1 (2008).
61.

Id. § 240.13f-1(a)(1).

62. Id. § 240.13f-1(b). The SEC has specified that:

An institutional investment manager exercises investment discretion if: (i) the manager has
the power to determine which securities are bought or sold for the account(s) under
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The requirements of section 13(f) apply to any institutional investment manager,
whether registered or not, if he or she meets the threshold amount.63 Therefore, if a
hedge fund meets the $100 million threshold, it must be in compliance with Section
13(f) and file a Form 13F report on a quarterly basis. This means that on a quarterly
basis, a section 13(f)-compliant hedge fund will disclose the majority, if not all, of its
long positions and, therefore, a significant portion of its trading strategy.64
B. Legislative History
Section 13(f) was added to the Exchange Act by Congress in the Securities Acts
Amendments of 1975.65 The amendments to the Exchange Act were enacted “to
remove barriers to competition, to foster the development of a national securities
market system . . . to facilitate the collection and public dissemination of information
concerning the holdings of and transactions in securities by institutional investment
managers.”66 According to the first SEC Release on section 13(f), in 1968 Congress
had
directed the Commission to make a study and investigation of the purchase,
sale, and holding of securities by institutional investors of all types, in order
to determine the effect of those activities upon the maintenance of fair and
orderly securities markets, the stability of those markets, and the interests of
issuers of securities and of the public.67

management; or (ii) the manager makes decisions about which securities are bought or sold
for the account(s), even though someone else is responsible for the investment decisions.
SEC, Frequently Asked Questions About Form 13F (May 2005), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/
investment/13ffaq.htm [hereinafter FAQ ].
63. Pizzani, supra note 11.
64. See FAQ , supra note 62. Short positions are not disclosed on Form 13F. Id. In response to the turmoil

in the financial markets in the fall of 2008, the SEC issued an emergency order, which requires
institutional investment managers who file Form 13F reports to disclose their short sales on a weekly
basis on Form SH. See Emergency Order Pursuant to section 12(k)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments, Exchange Act Release No.
58591 (Sept. 18, 2008), available at http://sec.gov/rules/other/2008/34-58591.pdf; Order Extending
Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 12(k)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Taking
Temporary Action to Respond to Market Development, Exchange Act Release No. 58711 (Oct. 1,
2008), available at http://sec.gov/rules/other/2008/34-58711.pdf. For information about the recent
economic turmoil and government response, see, for example, Greg Hitt & Deborah Solomon, Historic
Bailout Passes as Economy Slips Further, Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB122304922742602533.html. A discussion of this very recent development in the disclosure of
short sales and the financial market turmoil is beyond the scope of this note.
65.

See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No 94–29, sec. 10, § 13(f), 89 Stat. 97, 119–21 (1975)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f) (2006)).

66. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94–29, pmbl., 89 Stat. 97, 97 (1975).
67.

Reporting by Institutional Investment Managers, Exchange Act Release No. 13,396, 11 SEC Docket
2092 (Mar. 22, 1977).
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Congress passed the amendments at a time when the public was particularly anxious
about the influence of large-holding institutional investors on the markets.68
The Commission’s report concluded, among other things, “that the impact of
the institutions had increased significantly since the end of the Second World War,”
and so Congress decided to implement section 13(f).69 In 1978, the SEC adopted
Rule 13f-1.70 The basic purpose of section 13(f) and its accompanying rule was “to
create in the Commission a central repository of historical and current data about the
investment activities of institutional investment managers . . . .” 71 The reporting
system that the SEC created through Rule 13f-1 and the instructions to Form 13F
were both “designed to improve the body of factual data available and thus facilitate
consideration of the influence and impact of institutional investment managers on
the securities markets and the public policy implications of that influence.”72
Since its adoption there have been three significant changes to section 13(f),
Rule 13f-1, and the instructions to Form 13F. First, in 1979, the SEC adopted an
amendment that changed the frequency of disclosure from annual to quarterly.73
Although there had been some concern among institutional investment managers
about the burden of quarterly disclosure, the SEC found that it was in the best
interest of the public and that it did not create an excessive inconvenience for
institutional investment managers.74 Not only were managers concerned about the
burden of quarterly disclosure, but some also noted that “more frequent reports would
be of utility to block traders . . . .”75 Such concerns, however, were rejected because
the SEC feared that “if quarterly reporting [were] not required . . . such data might
be lost altogether thereby creating gaps in the continuous flow of information which
may be utilized for future policy decisions.”76
Second, in 1985, the SEC adopted amendments to the instructions of Form 13F,
allowing institutional investors engaged in open risk arbitrage to obtain confidential
treatment—that is, delayed public dissemination of the Form 13F reports—by
making “two good faith representations” regarding the manager’s open risk arbitrage

68. Thomas P. Lemke & Gerald T. Lins, Disclosure of Equity Holdings by Institutional Investment Managers:

An Analysis of Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 43 Bus. Law. 93, 97–98 (1987).
69. Id. at 99–100.
70. Id. at 101.
71. Filing and Reporting Requirements Relating to Institutional Investment Mangers, Exchange Act

Release No. 14,852, 1978 WL 196605 (June 15, 1978) [hereinafter June 1978 Release].
72. Id. Another objective of the reporting system was to create “uniform reporting standards and a uniform

centralized data base.” Id.
73. Filing and Reporting Requirements Relating to Institutional Investment Mangers, Exchange Act

Release No. 15,461, 16 SEC Docket 687 (Jan. 5, 1979).
74.

Id.

75. Id.
76. Id.

586

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

VOLUME 53 | 2008/09

positions to the SEC.77 If the institutional investment manager made these
representations, he or she would automatically be granted confidential treatment for
one year.78
Third, in 1999, the SEC adopted another amendment to section 13(f), requiring
the institutional investment managers to file their Form 13F disclosures electronically
via the SEC’s EDGAR system.79 According to the SEC, “[t]he public interest in
having these reports, along with other filings, available electronically has increased,
and the Commission believes that these reports should have the same degree of
availability as other Commission filings.”80
C. Confidential Treatment of Form 13F Reports & FOIA Exemption 4
In accordance with FOIA,81 the SEC provides institutional investment managers
who file Form 13F reports an opportunity to receive confidential treatment.82 In
order to receive this treatment, a manager must make a request pursuant to the
Exchange Act Rule 24b-2.83 Rule 24b-2 applies to any person who “fil[es] any
registration statement, report, application, statement, correspondence, notice or other
document . . . pursuant to the [Exchange] Act.”84 Under the rule, an applicant must
follow certain steps when filing for confidential treatment:
Such application shall be on a sheet or sheets separate from the confidential
portion, and shall contain (i) an identification of the portion; (ii) a statement
of the grounds of objection referring to, and containing an analysis of, the
applicable exemption(s) from disclosure under the Commission’s rules and
77.

Requests for Confidential Treatment Filed by Institutional Investment Managers, Exchange Act
Release No. 22,038, 33 SEC Docket 156 (May 14, 1985) [hereinafter May 1985 Release].

78. Id. For a more detailed discussion of this amendment, see infra Part IV.
79. Rulemaking for EDGAR System, Exchange Act Release No. 40,934, 68 SEC Docket 2814 (Jan. 12,

1999) [hereinafter January 1999 Release].
80. Id. The SEC further acknowledged:

[I]nvestors would find the information contained in Form 13F filings useful in tracking
institutional investor holdings in their investments and that issuers, too, would find detail
as to institutional investor holdings useful because much of their shareholder list may
reflect holdings in “street name” rather than beneficial ownership. Mandatory electronic
dissemination of this data will help ensure timely and efficient dissemination of this
important information.
Id.; see also SEC, Form 13F, http://sec.gov/about/forms/form13f.pdf [hereinafter Form 13F].
81.

5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).

82. See Confidential Treatment Procedures Under the Freedom of Information Act, Securities Act Release

No. 584, Exchange Act Release No. 6241, Investment Company Act Release No. 11,354, 20 SEC
Docket 1476 (Sept. 12, 1980).
83. 17 C.F.R. § 240.24b-2 (2008).
84. Id. § 240.24b-2(a). Form 13F also provides more details of how to request confidential treatment if that

treatment is based upon the fact that the information is “confidential, commercial or financial
information”; however, Form 13F does not make explicit mention of trade secrets. See Form 13F, supra
note 80, at 1–3.
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regulations adopted under the Freedom of Information Act (17 C.F.R.
200.80), and a justification of the period of time for which confidential
treatment is sought; (iii) a written consent to the furnishing of the confidential
portion to other government agencies, offices or bodies and to the Congress;
and (iv) the name of each exchange, if any, with which the material is filed.85

The rule directs an applicant to the SEC’s adoption of FOIA rules and
regulations. Under the SEC’s adoption of FOIA, there are certain records that the
SEC will not disseminate to the public.86 While the SEC is deciding whether to
grant confidential treatment, the information will not be released to the public.87
Although an applicant may ask the SEC to review a negative determination, such
review is discretionary.88 If an applicant does not petition the SEC for review or
inform the SEC of his or her intention to institute a court action, the information
will be made public five days after the applicant receives notice of the SEC’s
decision.89
Although FOIA provides nine exemptions from public disclosure, the only
exemption that is relevant to a manager filing a Form 13F report seeking confidential
treatment is Exemption 4, which applies to trade secrets, commercial, or financial
information.90 The instructions to Form 13F explicitly detail how a manager may
obtain confidential treatment for commercial or financial information, but in order
to receive confidential treatment for a trade secret a manager must meet the relevant
FOIA standard.91 The problem is not only that the FOIA definition of trade secrets
85. 17 C.F.R. § 240.24b-2(b)(2).
86. See id. § 200.80(b) (excluding from disclosure “nonpublic matters”). The rule specifically includes trade

secrets as falling under these “nonpublic matters.” Id. § 200.80(b)(4); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4)
(2006); Lemke & Lins, supra note 68, at 114–16. As noted in Continental Stock Transfer and Trust Co. v.
SEC, the statute and the SEC regulation are parallel exemptions. 566 F.2d 373, 375 (2d Cir. 1977).
Therefore, courts deciding upon issues involving this exemption will apply case law on FOIA Exemption
4. See, e.g., Lion Raisins Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 354 F.3d 1072, 1079–81 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting
that the party moving to make information “confidential” for purposes of the “trade secrets” exemption
must “show that there is (1) actual competition in the relevant market, and (2) a likelihood of substantial
competitive injury if the information were released”); Nadler v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 92 F.3d 93, 96
(2d Cir. 1996) (using the same two-part test as the District of Columbia Circuit—namely, the
information “must have the effect either (1) of impairing the government’s ability to obtain [necessary]
information . . . in the future, or (2) of causing substantial harm to the competitive position of the
person from whom the information was obtained” (citation omitted)); Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v.
Block, 755 F.2d 397, 399 (5th Cir. 1985) (same).
87.

17 C.F.R. § 240.24b-2(c).

88. Id. § 201.411.
89. Id. § 240.24b-2(e).
90. Lemke & Lins, supra note 68, at 116. The exact language of Exemption 4 is: “trade secrets and

commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.” 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(4).
91.

See, e.g., FOIA Appeal of Dooley, FOIA Release No. 186, 56 SEC Docket 472 (Feb. 25, 1994) (denying
confidential treatment to certain material because it did not fit within FOIA’s exemption for trade
secrets) (citing Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
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is restrictive, but also that the standard used to review a denial of a FOIA exemption
is the difficult-to-overcome “arbitrary and capricious” standard.92
Enacted in 1966, the “basic purpose of [FOIA] ‘is to ensure an informed
citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against
corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.’”93 Before FOIA
was enacted, “federal agencies [could] withhold information ‘in the public interest’ or
‘for good cause shown,’ or on the ground that the person seeking the record was not
‘properly or directly concerned.’”94 The passage of FOIA was largely considered a
response to the public’s concerns about potential secrecy and manipulation in the
government.95 One problem that is often seen, however, is that because of FOIA
“third parties have been able to obtain government files containing information
submitted by corporations and individuals who thought that the information would
be held in confidence.”96
Parties who wish to protect information from public disclosure may bring a
reverse-FOIA action and attempt to show why the specific information falls into one
of the nine exemptions.97 Reverse-FOIA actions are considered informal
adjudications. A court reviewing informal agency adjudications “must hold unlawful
and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”98 The arbitrary and
capricious standard greatly differs from the de novo standard that a court applies
when it reviews an agency’s decision in a regular FOIA request (i.e., when a member
of the public requests to access records). Under the arbitrary and capricious standard,
the “court has a very limited basis of review of an agency’s decision and can only
determine whether the agency had a rational basis for its decision.”99 In contrast,

92.

See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2006); see also, e.g., Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. SEC, 548 F. Supp. 6, 8 (D.D.C.
1982).

93.

Anderson v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting NLRB v.
Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978)); see also Lawrence Kaplan, Annotation, What
Constitutes “Trade Secrets and Commercial or Financial Information Obtained from Person and Privileged or
Confidential,” Exempt from Disclosure Under Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(4)) (FOIA),
139 A.L.R. Fed. 225, § 1[a], at § 2[a] (1997).

94. Kaplan, supra note 93.
95. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 285 (1979).
96. Id.
97.

See, e.g., id.

98. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. SEC, 873 F.2d 325, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)

(1986)).
99. Alexander & Alexander Servs., Inc. v. SEC, No. 92-1112, 1993 WL 439799, at *5 (D.D.C. Oct. 19,

1993) (emphasis added); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, 215 F. Supp. 2d
200, 204 (D.D.C. 2002) (“A reviewing court does not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the
agency under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review. Instead, the court simply determines
whether the agency action constitutes a clear error in judgment.”).
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under the de novo standard, the appellate court gives no deference to the district
court.100
Since the purpose of FOIA is to promote disclosure rather than hinder it, the
FOIA exemptions are construed narrowly.101 As one court noted, “FOIA contains a
presumption that records in the possession of federal agencies should be accessible to
the public.”102 It is generally accepted that:
[T]he purpose of exemption 4 . . . is to protect the confidentiality of
information submitted to the government . . . . [Some courts] emphasiz[e] the
function of insuring privacy or competitive position of the citizen proffering
such information, and other [courts] emphasiz[e] the need to encourage
cooperation with government by persons having information that is useful to
government officials.103

A problem that arises with exemption 4, however, is that if disclosure of an alleged
trade secret occurs, that trade secret, and the accompanying protection provided by
law, disappears. A secret can no longer be a secret if the public is aware of it.104
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition defines a trade secret as “any
formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information which is used in one’s business
and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do
not know or use it.”105 In Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the Restatement of Torts’s definition
of trade secrets was not applicable to FOIA exemption 4 because it was too broad.106
Although Congress did not provide a definition of trade secrets in adopting FOIA,
100. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 238 (1991) (“When de novo review is compelled, no form

of appellate deference is acceptable.”); see also Rebecca Silver, Comment, Standard of Review in FOIA
Appeals and the Misuse of Summary Judgment, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 731, 736 (2006) (“De novo review is the
strictest standard of review, in which the appellate court determines an issue ‘anew; afresh; a second
time.’”).
101. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 151 (1989); Herrick v. Garvey, 298 F.3d 1184, 1189

(10th Cir. 2002); Abraham Fruchter & Twersky LLP v. SEC, No. 05 Civ. 00039, 2006 WL 785285, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2006).
102. Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal. v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 290 F. Supp. 2d 124, 133 (D.D.C.

2003); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (placing the burden on the agency to sustain its action of
withholding agency records).
103. Kaplan, supra note 93, § 3.
104. See, e.g., Herrick, 298 F.3d at 1193–94; see also Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39

cmt. f (1995) (“To qualify as a trade secret, the information must be secret.”). In defining a trade secret,
an essential element is that it must be a secret. Therefore, in order to bring an action for misappropriation
of a trade secret, many courts require that the claimant have taken reasonable measure to protect the
secret. See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 175 (7th Cir. 1991).
105. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 (1995).
106. 704 F.2d 1280, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Prior to the publication of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair

Competition in 1995, the Restatement (First) of Torts, published in 1939, was the primary source of
modern substantive law of trade secrets. See 1 Melvin F. Jager, Trade Secrets Law § 3:2 (2008).
For sake of simplicity, the single term “Restatement” will be used hereinafter to refer to both Restatement
versions vis à vis the common law definition of trade secrets.
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the court reasoned that the intended definition was the common law definition.107
The court found that for purposes of FOIA a trade secret is “a secret, commercially
valuable plan, formula, process, or device that is used for the making, preparing,
compounding, or processing of trade commodities and that can be said to be the end
product of either innovation or substantial effort.”108
The key difference between the two definitions is that the Restatement only
requires that the trade secret could provide a competitive advantage to its holder,
while the restrictive FOIA definition requires a “direct relationship” between the
trade secret and the productive process (i.e., the labor exerted or the innovation used
to create the trade secret).109 In Public Citizen, there was precedent citing the
Restatement definition, and the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), the agency
party in the case, had adopted the Restatement definition in its regulations. However,
the court stated that since it was “bound by neither the agency’s interpretation nor
judicial precedent, we feel free to repudiate the broad Restatement approach and the
FDA’s regulation as inconsistent with the language of the FOIA and its underlying
policies.”110 The court was especially concerned that an overly broad definition of
trade secret would render the second exempted FOIA category of financial or
commercial information moot.111
IV. AUTOMATIC GRANT OF CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT SOLUTION

The combination of a restrictive definition of trade secrets and the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review creates a substantial burden for a hedge fund manager
to overcome when seeking exemption from public dissemination of a Form 13F
report. Therefore, more often than not, a hedge fund’s trading strategy, and arguably
its trade secrets, will be distributed to the public.112 Moreover, public dissemination
of Form 13F reports does not go unnoticed; the reports are used by the public,
107. Although usually “courts could simply assume that Congress intended the term to bear its common law

meaning in the absence of evidence to the contrary,” with trade secrets it was much more difficult
because both broad and narrow definitions existed at common law. Pub. Citizen, 704 F.2d. at 1286.
108. Id. at 1288 (emphasis added). “This definition, we believe, hews more closely to the language and

legislative intent of the FOIA than does the Restatement approach.” Id. at 1289.
109. See Anderson v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 944 (1990); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co.,

137 F.R.D. 372, 393 (D. Utah 1991) (explaining that “trade secrets should be defined in the narrower
common law sense”); 15 Fed. Proc. Law. Edition. § 38:146 (2008) (“Rejecting the broad definition of
trade secrets found in the Restatement, the courts have adopted a narrow definition of trade secrets . . .
. The narrower common-law definition of trade secret requires that there be a direct relationship
between the trade secret and the productive process.”).
110. Pub. Citizen, 704 F.2d at 1288.
111. Id. at 1289 (“If a trade secret can be any information used in a business which gives competitive

advantage, then there is little or no information left that could qualify as commercial or financial
information under the second category of the exemption without also qualifying as a trade secret.”).
112. See, e.g., Gregory Zuckerman, Edward Lampert Is in the Hunt—Sears Chairman Has Sent Signals He’s

Looking for Acquisitions—General Motors in His Sights?, Wall St. J., Sept. 19, 2006, at C1 (describing
one prominent hedge fund manager as “one of a small handful” who has received delayed confidential
treatment of his Form 13F report).
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including competitors, when determining which investments to make or track.113 By
analyzing a hedge fund’s Form 13F report, one can determine the type of industry in
which the fund is heavily invested,114 the size of companies in which a fund invests,115
and the number of shares owned in each such company.116
With the proliferation of the hedge fund market and the resulting difficulty in
generating strong returns in a more competitive market,117 a hedge fund’s trading
strategy, such as its current long positions and the balance thereof, is of crucial
importance because it can provide the fund with its competitive edge. The fact that
“few hedge funds now make impressive returns for their investors”118 is arguably

113. See Lemke & Lins, supra note 68, at 95–96 (noting that both parties to a merger and acquisition,

particularly hostile takeovers, use Form 13F reports “to aid in their planning”); Goldstein Exemption
Application, supra note 11, at 16–19 (providing examples of “how 13F filings are actually—and
illegitimately—used by investors in the real world”).
114. See, e.g., Goldstein Exemption Application, supra note 11, at 17 (“I’m not going to go over all the

positions [listed in an investor’s Form 13F] (there are more than 100 of them), and I’m going to focus on
[the investor’s] largest tech positions. On the whole, it seems [the investor] goes for tech stocks with the
following characteristics. . . .” (quoting James Altucher, Use This Filing to Trade Like Jeff Berkowitz,
Real Money, Mar. 1, 2008, republished in TheStreet.com, Mar. 2, 2006, http://www.thestreet.com/
comment/investing/10271190.html)).
115. See, e.g., Goldstein Exemption Application, supra note 11, at 16 (“This year’s cut [of what top mutual

fund managers invested in]: 23 funds that mostly own shares of large companies, 21 that like smaller
companies and 19 that invest internationally.” (quoting Christopher Helman, Picks of the Pros, Forbes.
com, Jan. 9, 2006, http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2006/0109/064.html)).
116. Goldstein Exemption Application, supra note 11, at 16 (quoting Helman, supra note 115).
117. See Cynthia Futter & Anne E. Wells, What to Expect from Hedge Funds Today and in the Future: An

Overview and Insolvency Perspective, 29 Cal. Bankr. J. 213 (2007). The authors discussed the future of
funds in light of the end of the “liquidity boom”:
What is known is that Funds did not perform better than their mutual fund counterparts
in 2006 and this may limit investors’ willingness to give them so much capital and pay such
high fees. Overall, the Funds returned 12.85% in 2006 while the Standard & Poor’s 500
hit 15.8%. The Funds earned an average of only 1% from April to September 2006 . . . .
Fund inflows plunged 64% from the third quarter of 2006 to the end of the year, dropping
from $44.5 billion in their third quarter to $15.8 billion in the fourth quarter of 2006. . . .
Whether fueled by mediocre returns, as compared to the returns in traditional equity
markets, or some looming concern about the lack of regulation, the market is clearly
slowing the migration of capital away [from] these Funds. Some commentators believe
that the trend will continue . . . .
Id. at 234–35; Desmet, supra note 33, at 6 (“Since 2002, in fact, hedge funds listed in the Credit Suisse/
Tremont Hedge Fund Index underperformed the S&P 500 two out of three years.”); Leonhardt, supra
note 32 (“Last year, the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index jumped 14 percent, while the average hedge
fund returned less than 13 percent, after investment fees, according to Hedge Fund Research in
Chicago.”); Hedge Funds Slump 1.5 Pct in 1st Qtr -Morningstar, Reuters, Apr. 17, 2008, http://www.
reuters.com/article/companyNews/idUSN1745151920080417 [hereinafter Hedge Funds Slump] (“Hedge
funds were down an average of 1.5 percent in the 2008 first quarter, their worst quarterly performance
in almost four years . . . .”).
118. Munk, supra note 33, at 130.
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linked to their proliferation and the resulting competition among funds.119 If a hedge
fund chooses to keep its trading strategies secret from its investors, it should be able
to prevent disclosure of those strategies to the general public.120
The SEC has previously modified section 13(f) and the instructions to Form
13F reports in response to certain influxes in highly sensitive business strategies that
are deserving of confidential treatment.121 In a 1984 Release, the SEC solicited
comments on its proposal to grant automatic confidential treatment to those engaged
in open risk arbitrage positions.122 The SEC noted that:
Based on its experience . . . the Commission believes that it should consider
whether decisions relating to confidential treatment of information about
open risk arbitrage positions can be made without all of the information
currently required . . . . Since the potential harm of public disclosure of such
positions is identifiable and similar for all open risk arbitrage positions as a
class (for example, if a merger which was the subject of risk arbitrage activity
was not consummated, an arbitrageur could be harmed when it attempted to
liquidate its position in adverse market conditions, if the extent of its position
were known to the public), the Commission is proposing [changes to the
confidentiality requirements].123

After receiving comments on its proposal, the SEC issued another release in
1985, which announced the adoption of the amendment.124 In order to receive
automatic confidential treatment, a manager engaged in open risk arbitrage must
make two representations: (1) that the “security holding represents a risk arbitrage
119. There seems to be a correlation between the increase in the number of hedge funds and the decrease in

hedge funds’ performances. Compare Daniel, supra note 3, at 248 (citing an increase from 300 hedge
funds worth a total of $39 billion in 1990 to 8000 to 9000 hedge funds worth a total of nearly $1 trillion
in 2005), Fraidin & Hoverman, supra note 38, at 405 (noting SEC Chairman Christopher Cox’s
estimate that there are nearly 8800 hedge funds managing a total of around $1.2 trillion of assets),
Futter & Wells, supra note 117, at 214–15 (noting a substantial increase in hedge fund investment
dollars), Gibson, supra note 20, at 685 (citing an estimate that in 1998 there were 3000 hedge funds,
which operated between $200 and $300 billion in capital), and MacDonald, supra note 15 (stating that
there are 351 hedge funds which manage $1 billion or more), with Hedge Funds Slump, supra note 117
(reporting hedge funds lost an average of 1.5% in the first quarter of 2008).
120. Furthermore, once a trade secret is made public it is no longer a trade secret, and a hedge fund no longer

has a private cause of action for any misappropriation of its trade secret by employees or competitors. In
order to bring an action for trade secret misappropriation, a claimant must show: (1) that the product or
information was not generally known, i.e., it was a trade secret; (2) the claimant attempted reasonable
precautions to prevent disclosure of the trade secret; and (3) that the trade secret was acquired wrongly,
i.e., misappropriated. Robert P. Merges, Peter S. Menell & Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual
Property in the New Technological Age 37 (4th ed. 2006).
121. See supra Part III.B.
122. Requests for Confidential Treatment Filed by Institutional Investment Managers, Exchange Act

Release No. 21,539, 31 SEC Docket 1052 (Dec. 5, 1984) (“[T]he term ‘risk arbitrage’ refers to the
risking of capital in connection with a proposed merger, acquisition, tender offer, or similar transaction
involving recapitalization.”).
123. Id.
124. See May 1985 Release, supra note 77.
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position that is open on the last day of the calendar quarter for which a [Form 13F]
report is filed” and (2) that “the reporting manager has a reasonable belief as of the
calendar quarter end that it may not close the entire position on or before the date on
which the [Form 13F] report is required to be filed with the Commission.” 125
At the time of the open risk arbitrage amendment, there was a flood of merger
and acquisition (“M&A”) activity in the markets.126 One journalist, in surveying the
M&A activity of the 1980s, described the decade as follows:
Talk about thrills and chills, to say nothing of titanic egos and epic greed.
The financial civil war that swept across America in the past decade was a
ripsnorting string of shoot-’em-ups like nothing ever seen on Wall Street or
Main Street. Withering volleys of money shot back and forth as insurgents
stormed one entrenched corporate position after another. Counting friendly
and hostile deals, more than a third of the companies in the FORTUNE 500
industrials were swallowed up by other concerns or went private.127

According to another report, “a towering $1.3 trillion was spent on shuff ling
assets—an amount on a par with the annual economic output of West Germany”
during the 1980s.128 Although the M&A activity of the 1980s was not always looked
upon fondly by commentators, regulators, or academics,129 like hedge funds today it
provided benefits for the financial markets.130 For example:
125. Id.
126. See Lee Hammer, Comment, Turning a Blind Eye: The Ninth Circuit’s Approach to Fraudulent Conveyances

and Leveraged Buyouts, 31 Sw. U. L. Rev. 237, 237 (2002). According to the author:
More than a decade has passed since the words of Gordon Gecko were forever added to the
lexicon of American business practice. “Greed is good” became the calling card for
corporate raiders, such as Michael Milken and Ivan Boesky. For ten years, the corporate
landscape in the 1980s was littered with leveraged buy-outs, both successes and failures.
Id.; see also Eugene F. Brigham & Joel F. Houston, Fundamentals of Financial Management
805 (Mike Reynolds et al. eds., Thomson 8th ed. 1998). According to the authors:
Five major “merger waves” have occurred in the United States. The first was in the late
1800s, when consolidations occurred in the oil, steel, tobacco, and other basic industries.
The second was in the 1920s, when the stock market boom helped financial promoters
consolidate firms in a number of industries, including utilities, communications, and autos.
The third was in the 1960s, when conglomerate mergers were the rage. The fourth began
in the 1980s, when LBO [leveraged buy-out] firms and others began using junk bonds to
finance all manner of acquisitions. The fifth, which involves strategic alliances designed
to enable firms to compete better in the global economy, is in progress today.
Brigham & Houston, supra, at 805.
127. Edmund Faltermayer, The Deal Decade: Verdict on the 80s, Fortune, Aug. 26, 1991, at 58.
128. Michael O’ Neal et al., The Best and Worst Deals of the 80s, Bus. Wk., Jan. 15, 1990, at 52.
129. See, e.g., Faltermayer, supra note 127; Christopher Farrell et al., LBOs: The Stars, the Strugglers, the Flops,

Bus. Wk., Jan. 15 1990, at 58 (“Once upon a time, when the Great Depression was a vivid memory, the
‘good’ company had lots of equity and scant debt. But in the decade of Mike Milken, Kohlberg Kravis
Roberts, and Japan, Inc., going deeply into hock became a sign of corporate virility.”).
130. See Larry E. Ribstein, Imagining Wall Street, 1 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 165, 175 (2006) (comparing what

Mikhail Gorbachev sought to do to the Russian economy with his policy of perestroika to what LBO
restructurings of the 1980s did to “pave the way for the extended bull market of the 1990s”).
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Most 1980s mergers were financial transactions in which buyers sought to
buy companies that were selling at less than their true values as a result of
incompetent or sluggish management. If a target company could be managed
better, if redundant assets could be sold, and if operating and administrative
costs could be cut, profits and stock prices would rise.131

Under this view, the 1980s M&A activity was a correction to the market’s underpricing of companies that had a higher actual value than was reflected in their stock
prices, thus adding value to shareholders by increasing market price and encouraging
the optimism that pervaded the market of the 1990s.132
Just as there was an abundance of M&A activity in the 1980s, there is a rise in
activity in the hedge fund market. As noted, there are between eight and ten
thousand hedge funds in existence,133 which manage approximately $2 trillion in
capital.134 To keep that market vibrant, the SEC should consider adopting another
amendment to Rule 13f-1. Like the open risk arbitrage amendment, this proposed
amendment would require the requesting manager to make “good faith” representations
that the fund’s trading strategies not only meet the FOIA standard of trade secrets,
but also that the fund has made reasonable precautions to keep its trading strategies
secret from the public, including its investors.135 Like the open risk arbitrage
amendment, the SEC could place a limitation on the period of time that confidential
treatment would be granted.136 The requested period of confidentiality should be
reasonable and justifiable,137 and the SEC should solicit comments from institutional
investment managers, specifically hedge fund managers, in order to determine the
appropriate confidentiality period.138
By adopting this proposed amendment, the SEC would still be able to further
the principal objectives of section 13(f): to analyze and compile data about the
131. Brigham & Houston, supra note 126, at 806.
132. See Ribstein, supra note 130.
133. Futter & Wells, supra note 117, at 215 (predicting there will be more than 11,700 hedge funds by

2008).
134. McDonald, supra note 15.
135. As discussed previously, in order to bring an action for the misappropriation of trade secrets, the plaintiff

must show that he took reasonable precautions to protect the secrecy. See Merges et al., supra note
120. For recent cases involving the misappropriation of a hedge fund’s trade secrets, see Zimmer v.
CooperNeff Advisors, Inc., 523 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2008) (involving a trade secret that was a computer
model used to rank stocks that the hedge fund may obtain); Bergerson v. Deephaven Capital Mgmt.,
LLC, No. 03-1090, 2006 WL 305271 (D. Minn. Feb 8, 2006) (involving a hedge fund that claimed
that its customer lists were trade secrets).
136. In the open risk arbitrage amendment, the SEC stated that if the two good faith representations were

made, then “confidential treatment would be granted automatically for a period of one year.” May 1985
Release, supra note 77.
137. Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 240.24b-2(b)(2) (2008) (requiring “a justification of the period of time for which

confidential treatment is sought”).
138. The SEC solicited comments on the period of confidentiality for open risk arbitrage positions as well.

See Requests for Confidential Treatment Filed by Institutional Investment Managers, Exchange Act
Release No. 21,539, 31 SEC Docket 1052 (Dec. 5, 1984).
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market139 without disclosing confidential information to the public. This proposed
amendment would balance the interest of the public, in that the SEC could still
monitor the impact of large-holding institutional investment managers on the market
and create policy in response to that impact, with the interest of the private hedge
fund managers, who wish to protect their trading strategies from public
dissemination.140
V. CONCLUSION

Hedge funds have garnered much attention in recent years.141 Whether it is
because of their lack of regulation, the extreme wealth of those who manage them, or
their alleged “secrecy,”142 whenever a large hedge fund collapses, regulators, investors,
and commentators furiously turn their attention to the industry.143 It remains to be
seen whether the SEC will be successful in its recent attempts to regulate the hedge
fund industry; however, at this moment, many hedge funds that are exempt from
registration are still required to produce Form 13F reports to the SEC on a quarterly
basis.144 These reports, which contain a hedge fund’s long positions, are then
disclosed to the public, unless a hedge fund can successfully obtain confidential
139. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94–29, pmbl., 89 Stat. 97, 97 (1975).
140. Another point to make with respect to section 13(f) and Form 13F Reports is that the purpose of

disclosure, as a whole, is to protect the public—that is why securities issued to the public are registered
with the SEC. However, the securities laws provide certain exemptions from registration for securities
that are offered to accredited investors, i.e., high net worth and sophisticated investors, because those
investors are deemed to be of an investment sophistication that does not require the broad protection of
the securities laws, and they can measure the risk and benefits of their investments without disclosure.
Many of these exemptions are the ones that hedge funds employ to avoid registration because their
investors tend to be accredited investors. See, e.g., Desmet, supra note 33, at 4 (“Traditional hedge funds
have steep investment minimums, from $1 million to as high as $50 million per investor.”); Nelson,
supra note 28, at 229 (“[H]edge fund investors are a small, elite segment of the investing public.”). See
generally James D. Cox, Robert W. Hillman & Donald C. Langevoort, Securities Regulation:
Cases and Materials 289–322 (5th ed. 2006) (discussing the Regulation D exemption).
141. See supra Part II.
142. See, e.g., Matthew Goldstein, Note, A Secret Society: Hedge Funds and Their Mysterious Success,  J. Int’l

Bus. & L. 111 (2007).
143. See supra Part II.C.
144. The fact that, as a whole, hedge funds are not registered is important to the argument regarding

confidential treatment of Form 13F reports. If a hedge fund is registered with the SEC, it is required to
make many other disclosures regarding its business and therefore, attempting to gain confidential
treatment of its Form 13F reports would be moot. See generally Cox et al., supra note 140, at 1128–29
(discussing the registration exemptions under the Investment Company Act used by hedge funds to gain
exempt status). Unlike hedge funds, mutual funds are investment vehicles that are regulated by the
SEC under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2006), and the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21. See Nelson, supra note 28, at 223. Because mutual
funds are regulated by the SEC, they are transparent investment vehicles, meaning they are subject to
disclosure requirements. Therefore, the benefit of an automatic confidential treatment of their holdings
is unnecessary. See Nelson, supra note 28, at 231. Furthermore, it is important to note that although
hedge funds do have a large amount of capital to invest, “hedge funds hold far fewer assets than mutual
funds.” Id. at 226.
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treatment through the use of FOIA exemption 4. In order to obtain confidential
treatment, however, a hedge fund has an almost insurmountable burden to overcome
because of the strict trade secret definition as well as the standard of review employed
by the courts.
An automatic grant of confidential treatment provided to a hedge fund manager
who represents that his or her holdings are FOIA trade secrets would help remedy
this burden. This automatic treatment is of particular importance to hedge funds
because of their proliferation and recent difficulty in the continued production of
strong returns.145 In the past, the SEC has amended its Form 13F instructions to
allow those engaged in open risk arbitrage the opportunity to receive automatic
confidential treatment; thus, there is precedent within the rule itself to give hedge
funds such treatment. If the SEC does not address this issue, there is a risk of more
litigation regarding this regulation.146

145. See, e.g., Donna Kardos, Survey of Hedge Funds Finds 35% Lost Assets, Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 2008, at C4

(noting that a “survey of the largest U.S. hedge-fund firms showed that 35% of them lost assets in the
first half of the year, putting the growth rate at 4.3%, the lowest in six years”).
146. See sources cited supra note 11 and Part II.A.
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